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BLACKMAIL, EXTORTION AND FREE SPEECH:
A REPLY TO POSNER, EPSTEIN, NOZICK
AND LINDGREN
Walter Block* & David Gordon**
At one time in the history of the law "blackmail" and "extortion"
were used synonymously to denote the demand for money or other valuable consideration upon the threat of force or violence.' Such acts were
proscribed by law; very properly so, since the bedrock of civilized order
is that people refrain from initiating force or fraud or the threat thereof
against each other.
But while "extortion" has continued to be used in this restricted
manner, the concept of "blackmail" has been expanded enormously. 2
Nowadays, blackmail is used to denote practically any commercial practice strongly disapproved of by the speaker, such as the OPEC price increase, 3 as well as what is still meant by extortion. This is unfortunate, if
only on semantic grounds. But it is even more problematic since there is
now no concept in the English language which unambiguously refers to a
demand for money or other valuable consideration under the threat of
exercising one's right of free speech by publicizing someone else's secret
without use of the threat of force or violence.
For the purposes of this Article, we shall define blackmail in precisely that way. In Section I, we make and defend the claim that the
* B.A. 1964, Brooklyn College; Ph.D. 1972, Columbia University. Senior Economist,
Fraser Institute, Vancouver, British Columbia. Author of DEFENDING THE UNDEFENDABLE
(1978), AMENDING THE COMBINES INVESTIGATION AcT (1982), and ON ECONOMICS AND
THE CANADIAN BISHOPS (1983).
** B.A. 1969, University of California, Los Angeles; M.A. 1970, University of California,
Los Angeles; Ph.D. 1975, University of California, Los Angeles. Fellow, Institute for Humane
Studies, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia. Previous articles include Is the Prisoner's
Dilemma an Insolvable Problem?, 93 MIND 98 (1984), Honderich on Morality Dependent
Harm, 32 POL. STUD. 288 (1984), and Gillespie on Singer's GeneralizationArgument, 95 ETHICS 75 (1984).
1. Winder, The Development of Blackmail, 5 MOD. L. REv. 21, 23-24 (1941).
2. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, blackmail was first used in its modem
sense in 1840. 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 895 (1971). See also Block, Trading Money
for Silence 2-6 (1985) (unpublished manuscript) (to be published in THE ECONOMIC APPROACH APPLIED OUTSIDE THE TRADmONAL AREAS OF ECONOMICS (G. Radnitzky & P.
Bemholz eds. 1986)).
3. See, eg., P. JOHNSON, MODERN TIMES: THE WORLD FROM THE TWENTIES TO THE
EIGHTIES 667 (1983).
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prohibition of blackmail is incompatible with the philosophy underlying

our criminal law. In Sections II, III, IV and V, we consider and reject
objections to this thesis made by, respectively, Richard Posner,4 Richard
Epstein,5 Robert Nozick 6 and James Lindgren.7
I.

IN DEFENSE OF LEGALIZING BLACKMAIL

As defined, blackmail should not be accorded the legal sanctions

usually meted out in response to criminal behavior since it does not entail
the violation of rights.' Rather, it consists of the offer of a commercial

trade. The blackmailer will remain silent about the humiliating, embarrassing or even criminal secret of the blackmailee, 9 accepting payment in

return. If the offer to trade money for silence is rejected, the blackmailer
will publicize the secret, which is part of his rights of free speech. In

these terms the distinction between extortion and blackmail may be made
as follows: extortion utilizes a threat to do something illicit, such as
commit murder, arson or kidnapping. The threat of blackmail is limited
to what would otherwise be licit-commit an act of free speech. If a
person has the right to do X, he necessarily has the right to give warning

of the fact that he will do or may do X-that is, to threaten to do X.
Blackmail is thus a noncriminal act.
Blackmail, then, is a "capitalist act between consenting adults," to
use the felicitous phrase introduced by Robert Nozick. 10 As such, ac4. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977). See infra notes 14-22 and
accompanying text.
5. Epstein, Blackmail, Inc, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 553 (1983). See infra notes 24-44 and
accompanying text.
6. R. NOzICK, ANARCHY, STATE, & UTOPIA (1974). See infra notes 45-57 and accompanying text.
7. Lindgren, Unravelingthe Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 670 (1984). See
infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
8. Block, supra note 2, concluded as follows:
Let nothing said above be interpreted as affirming the propriety or morality of
blackmail. This practice has not been claimed to be ethical. Our only claim is that
blackmail is not akin to theft, not an invasive act, nor threat thereof, nor an initiation
of violence, nor a violation of rights-and that therefore it should not be prohibited
by force of law.
Our present blackmail statutes are violations of the free speech rights of blackmailers. They do not protect the persons or property of the so-called victims of
blackmail. Society would be better of [sic], and human rights more secure, if our
blackmail legislation were terminated.
Id. at 52-53 (footnote omitted).
9. Just as the law cannot properly compel the individual to be a good Samaritan, so can it
not compel him to acquaint the legal authorities with the facts concerning crimes he knows to
have taken place. Turning in the criminal may thus be an act over and above the call of duty,
but it is not an act of duty itself.
10. R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, & UTOPIA (1974).
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cording to the laws of economics, it must benefit both parties.1 It is easy
to see how the blackmailer gains from the trade. He is paid merely for
holding his tongue. But the "victim" also gains. Both parties gain from
a voluntary trade, and this is as true of the exchange of money for silence
as it is for any other case. The payment extracted must be worth less to
the victim than the costs of having his secret uncovered. Otherwise he or
she would reject the deal, stating in effect, "Publish and be damned!"12 In
contrast to the gossip, who tells the secret without even affording the
victim the opportunity of purchasing silence, the blackmailer can be seen
as a benefactor.
Also, blackmail has social, or spillover, benefits. Were it legalized,
the presumption is that more people would engage in this activity. If this
occurred, real criminal activity would be retarded. The miscreants
would now have to share their ill-gotten gains with the blackmailer. This
would reduce the expected gain from criminal activity, 3 since the apprehended perpetrator would not only have to give up his booty, but would
also be penalized up to the value he places on not going to jail, which
may well be higher than the proceeds of any specific crime.
II.

POSNER: THE EFFICIENCY OBJECTION TO BLACKMAIL

One objection to our account of blackmail has been put forth by
Richard Posner. 4 He begins by confining himself to cases where the
threat of the blackmailer is to expose a crime committed by the
blackmailee. In Posner's view, "[o]verenforcement of the law would result if the blackmailer were able to extract the full fine from the offender."' 5 His reasoning seems to be that if the state subjects the
criminal to the optimal fine, and the blackmailer extracts his own pound
of flesh, then the total amount of enforcement will be too high.
But this is, at best, highly conjectural. It can hardly be assumed
that government has in its infinite wisdom hit upon precisely the optimal
fine, nor does Posner put forth any evidence to back up such a claim. As
Epstein trenchantly remarks, this "explanation ... presupposes that we
have reason to believe that the current level of public enforcement is opti11. See, eg., R. NozICK, supra note 10, at 84-87.
12. This quote is attributed to Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington, when his mistress
threatened to publish her diary and his letters. J. BARTLETr, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 506a
(E. Beck 14th ed. 1968).
13. W. BLOCK, DEFENDING THE UNDEFENDABLE 53-58 (1976).
14. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977).

15. R. POSNER, supra note 14, at 473. See also Landes & Posner, The PrivateEnforcement
of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 42-43 (1975).
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mal by some standard. Standing alone, it cannot explain why blackmail
is considered criminal without regard to mode or levels of public
16
enforcement."
The Posnerian objection could be couched in terms of resources allocated toward the apprehension of criminals instead of in terms of optimal levels of fines or payments imposed by the blackmailer. Given that
the blackmailer works as a sort of private enterprise policeman-discouraging crime by threatening to capture its fruits for himself-the resources
he expends, added to the public resources devoted to this task, might
result in an overallocation of resources. But this would be true if and
only if the public investment in this activity is optimal. The overallocation claim also founders on the unproven assumption that governmental
activity in this area is perfectly allocated.
Posner fails to show that a public monopoly of law enforcement is
optimal. He argues that "an efficient criminal sanction will ordinarily
involve combining a severe penalty with a relatively low probability of
apprehension and conviction." 17 That is to say, instead of attempting to
capture each and every criminal in order to maximize profits, as a private
agency might, a public monopoly of law enforcement can take a more
efficient path. It can devote relatively few resources to catching criminals
and deal harshly with those it does catch, without any loss in deterrent
effect. Why is this? Deterrence, Posner correctly maintains, is a function
of the severity of the sentence multiplied by the probability of enforcement.1 8 The state can compensate for decreases in one variable by increasing the other. Hence, Posner concluded that a public monopoly of
law enforcement could spend less on catching criminals than private
agencies, and not necessarily reduce deterrence.1 9 With a public monopoly, as the probability of having a sentence enforced is decreased, the
severity of the sentence could be increased.
But this ingenious argument, even if correct, fails as a reason not to
legalize blackmail. At best it shows that a monopoly of law enforcement
is more efficient than a system of private agencies. It does not show that
a combination of public and private enforcement is less efficient than a
public monopoly alone. Perhaps the augmented deterrence which blackmail would add to public enforcement is optimal, even if one concedes to
Posner that a public agency is needed.
Posner's reply here is obvious. Wouldn't it be more efficient, if pri16. Epstein, Blackmail, Inc., 50 U. CHi. L. REv. 553, 561-62 n.15 (1983).
17. R. POSNER, supra note 14, at 463.
18. Id. at 165.
19. Id. at 463.
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vate deterrence augments a public agency, to provide the augmented deterrence simply by increasing the severity of the sentences? But this need
not be the case. It may turn out that beyond a certain point people will
be so unwilling to enforce a sentence that the product of the sentence
multiplied by the probability of application will be insufficient to secure
much deterrence. Presumably this is why sentencing parking violators to
death would not be efficient. It does not automatically follow that the
higher the sentence the less that can be spent on enforcement, and still
keep the level of deterrence constant.
One might wonder whether the argument can be carried a stage further. How do we know-given that a public agency is not necessarily
more efficient than a private one-that a public agency is more efficient
in overall deterrence than a system of private agencies? We do not know
this; however, it does seem plausible that the effect Posner describes operates at some level. To the extent that it does, an agency aimed at providing deterrence most efficiently is in a position, by taking advantage of
Posner's effect, to spend fewer resources on enforcement than an agency
interested in maximizing revenue from criminals. This, however, introduces a further qualification to Posner's argument. An agency interested in providing deterrence most efficiently need not be apublic agency,
much less a monopoly. Why can't a private protection agency aim at
providing deterrence efficiently? For all Posner has shown, a private
agency can do so as long as it aims at maximizing its revenue by fees
from consumers rather than from fines, or at least not exclusively from
fines.
There is, however, a more basic reason for dismissing Posner's objection to our analysis of blackmail. Let us assume that government
crime prevention activity, whether in terms of fines specified or resources
expended, is optimal. Under such an assumption, of course, it would be
true that both public and private efforts, added together, are overoptimal.
Still, it does not follow that private initiatives such as blackmail must be
reduced, let alone prohibited. For there is an alternative--diminish or
eliminate the public sector! There are several reasons for preferring this
option.
First, the raison d'etre for state action is that private efforts will not
be forthcoming, or will be insufficient (e.g., the free rider problem and
external neighborhood effects).2 0 However, such a situation does not
prevail in this case. Far from there being insufficient or no private activity, Posner's complaint is that the blackmailer, in conjunction with the
20. See, eg., M. FRIEDMAN, CAPrrAusM AND FREEDOM 22-36 (1962).
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government, will overallocate resources to crime prevention. Therefore,
if public plus private efforts are superfluous, and if the argument for government activity is based on the absence of individual initiatives, then it
is the former which should be cut back, not the latter.
There is a second reason for curtailing the public rather than the
private sector. This has to do with the concept of an optimal amount of
investment in crime prevention. This may be paradoxical to some. At a
time of rampant criminality, at a time when numerous public opinion
polls have shown that this is an issue of great if not prime importance to
an outraged citizenry, it may appear grotesque to think of too many resources being devoted to prevention of crime. Nevertheless, the concept
does make sense. As more funds are devoted to this task, there is a point
where each dollar buys less additional crime reduction. Eventually, the
utility of an extra dollar spent in this way will fall below its value in
alternative pursuits. We could, in the extreme case, spend the entire
Gross National Product on dealing with crime while starving to death.
But this level of expenditure depends solely on the preference of the
individual (as does the rate, extent and even existence of the declining
utility of money spent in retarding crime). Some people may be passionately devoted to this enterprise; others may be pacifists on the crime
question; and most will occupy a middle ground.
Consider the analogy to charity. Assume that both private and public charitable efforts, taken together, are excessive. Under our first line of
argument, the latter, not the former, should be reined in since the raison
d'etre for welfare is the insufficiency or nonexistence of private charity.
According to our second line of argument, private charity, at whatever
level, simply cannot be excessive, since it depends entirely on the subjective value preferences of the individuals concerned. 2 '
What of cases where the blackmailer's threat is not to expose a
crime of his "victim," but to make known an embarrassing, but not illegal, episode in his life? Here, too, Posner favors the prohibition of blackmail. In his view blackmail should be
forbidden in areas where there are no legal prohibitions at allwhere the information would humiliate, but not incriminate,
21. In making this claim, we must of course, consider the possibility of external economies. Obviously, if person A contributes to charity, or squelches crime by blackmailing, person B can reduce his own efforts and "free ride" on A. But this is an explanation for the
possible underallocation of resources in these activities, not overallocation as feared by Posner.
Also, this phenomenon can take place in either the public or private sector. Since here we are
concerned with distinguishing between these alternatives, possible positive externalities can be
safely ignored.
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the blackmailer's victim. The social decision not to regulate a
particular activity is a judgment that the expenditure of resources on trying to discover and punish it would be socially
wasted. That judgment is undermined if blackmailers are encouraged to expend substantial resources on investigating people engaged in the activity.'2
This argument seems to be a complete non sequitur. The decision
not to regulate a particular activity is based, at most, only on the view
that it would not be efficient to spend public resources to enforce public
regulations. This provides no insight into the efficiency of also spending
private resources that will partly deter the activity. Posner contents himself with deducing that such an activity is "socially wasteful" from the
fact that blackmail of noncriminals is prohibited. 3 But this circular tack
proves far too much. If mere legal prohibition of X proves X to be "socially wasteful," how can we analyze, for example, the prohibition of alcohol in the U.S. during the 1930's? Must we say that alcohol
consumption was "socially useful" before and after Prohibition, while
"socially wasteful" only during this era? If we do, our only "evidence"
will be the law of the land. Posner's circular opposition to the legalization of blackmail is not based on any theory of law; it is merely an ad hoc
expression of Posner's own subjective tastes on the matter. Perhaps Posner's argument is that since enforcement is inefficient, private enforcement would be inefficient as well. But we have already seen a reason to
reject this premise. Posner has not demonstrated the superior efficiency,
in all cases, of public enforcement.
Even if one grants Posner all his arguments about the inefficiency of
blackmail, it does not follow that he has made a case for its prohibition.
Perhaps trying to prohibit blackmail is also inefficient. If it is, putting up
with the inefficiencies Posner discusses may be worthwhile. If the inefficiencies of prohibiting blackmail outweigh the inefficiencies of blackmail
itself, this needs to be shown by argument. Nonetheless Posner says
nothing about the inefficiency of prohibiting blackmail.
Finally, there is one further weakness in Posner's treatment of
blackmail. Suppose that all he says is correct. Then, blackmail must be
a wasteful and inefficient means of deterring crime and of interfering with
noncriminal customs. Does it follow from this that blackmail should be
prohibited? Is it a crime to be an inefficient enforcer of law? Should our
analysis be focused on the effect of blackmail as a deterrent of certain
22. R. POSNER, supra note 14, at 473.
23. Id.
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types of behavior? While its effects in this area are extremely important,
the primary aim of the activity is to secure certain gains to those engaged
in it. To make a case for the prohibition of blackmail on the grounds of
efficiency, one must show that there is something "wrong" with transactions of this kind. That blackmail is not the best means to achieve some
other purpose (i.e., law enforcement) is of secondary significance. This
holds true, of course, unless blackmail's effect on law enforcement is socially more important than the direct gains and losses of the transaction.
But this would need to be shown by argument.
III. EPSTEIN: MORALITY AND BLACKMAIL, INC.
We now turn to the case made by Richard Epstein in support of
prohibiting blackmail.2 4 At first blush, this is a rather unlikely statement, since the first two sections of Blackmail, Inc. constitute perhaps
the most magnificient, comprehensive, insightful, articulate, careful and
well-reasoned defense of the legalization of blackmail ever penned.
Epstein begins by resisting Posner's claim that the matter is settled
merely because a legislature holds an activity to be illegal.
It is a grave mistake to confuse the necessary conditions of notice and codification with the sufficient substantive conditions
for criminal responsibility. If the legislature sought to declare
marriage, schooling, or gardening criminal offenses, in all likelihood it could define their content with sufficient precision to
avoid any procedural challenges based upon the want of notice.
But even in a system that placed no constitutional limitations
upon the legislative power (as is still the case in England, where
much of this debate has originated) to declare a certain activity
criminal, we should still demand some explanation of why this
particular activity, but not others, should be classified as
25
illegal.

Epstein continues with a moral theory of criminal responsibility that
is nothing less than superlative in its focus on force or fraud, or the threat
thereof, as the essence of criminal activity.26 He also recognizes the sine
qua non of blackmail analysis: that the blackmailer threatens to do that
which he otherwise has a complete right to do, that is, to exercise his
rights of free speech. As stated by Epstein, "where a person has the right
24. Epstein, Blackmail, Ina, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 553 (1983).
25. Id. at 554.
26. Id. at 555-56. For a fully developed legal philosophy based on this insight, see generally, M. ROTHBARD, THE ETmcs OF LIBERTY (1982).
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to do a certain act-for example, not to sell goods at a particular pricehe has the right to threaten to do that act."2 7 Going over and above the
call of duty, Epstein even recognizes that the only exception to the legitimacy of blackmail is when the information utilized is discovered improperly through force or fraud.2 8
Epstein then attempts "to account for the powerful sentiment that
blackmail should be criminal."2 9 Given the airtight defense of the case
for legalization he has just rendered, this is no easy task. He begins by
leaving off the micro discussion of the blackmailer and the blackmailee,
and takes up the macro level of the larger social framework. Epstein
asks: "[W]hat would the world look like if blackmail were legalized to
the extent that seems to be required by our general moral theory?" 3 0 His
answer is Blackmail, Inc., a large corporation in the "open and public"
blackmail market, which would offer to acquire information leading to
the degradation or humiliation of people-so that silence about these
secrets could be sold to them. 3 ' He forecasts, quite reasonably, that the
contracts Blackmail, Inc. would draw between itself and its suppliers of
information would be quite complex.32 Maybe so. But this complexity
hardly justifies his claim that he has borne "limited fruit" in his quest to
justify the prohibition of blackmail.3 3 For one thing, he has not demonstrated that if blackmail were legalized, large firms engaging in blackmail
would arise on the market. Blackmail, Inc. is a possibility; but for all
Epstein has shown, it is no more than a possibility. Yet his argument in
part turns on the existence of such firms.
Next, Epstein considers the commercial relationship between Blackmail, Inc. and the blackmailee. Here he believes that he has uncovered
the essential evil of blackmail. First, not only may Blackmail, Inc. demand money of the blackmailee, but if the latter does not have the requisite funds, the corporation may hint, "ever so slightly, that it thinks
strenuous efforts to obtain the necessary cash should be undertaken." 34
Continues Epstein, "[d]o we believe that [the blackmailee] would never
resort to fraud or theft given this kind of pressure, when the very nature
of the transaction cuts off his access to the usual financial sources, such
27. Epstein, supra note 24, at 557 (emphasis in original).
28. Id. at 558-60. See also Block, supra note 2, at 2-43 (providing an argument which
parallels the treatment of blackmail found in the first two sections of Epstein's paper).
29. Epstein, supra note 24, at 562.
30. Id. (emphasis in original removed).
31. Id. at 563.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 563-64.
34. Id. at 564.
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as banks or friends, who would want to know the purpose of the loan?" 3
Secondly, not only can Blackmail, Inc. engage in blackmail, but as a "full
service firm" it can help the blackmailee uphold the fraud and deceit he
perpetrates on the people from whom he hides his guilty secret.3 6
Here we arrive at the nub of the matter, Epstein's reason why blackmail should be prohibited by law. "We now see the critical difference
between blackmail and kindred transactions, such as the protection of
trade secrets. Only blackmail breeds fraud and deceit."' 37 But this will
not do.
For one thing, it proves far too much. Yes, the legalization of blackmail may well encourage and cause the "victim" to make "strenuous efforts" to engage in fraud or theft to pay off his tormentor. But people
steal for so many other reasons: impressing their friends, "buying baby a
new pair of shoes," poverty, alcoholism, addiction, jealousy, dares, and
for various and sundry political ideals. If blackmail should be prohibited
because it may encourage crime, so should these other activities. This is
surely unacceptable. What should be legally proscribed is crime itself,
not phenomena which may or may not3 8 lead to criminal behavior.
39
Epstein's second criticism, on the grounds of supporting fraud,
fails on the same ground. Yes, Blackmail, Inc. may better enable the bed
wetter, the communist or the homosexual to keep his secret, perpetuating
the "fraud" he practices on those who would do him ill, if they only
knew. However, since these activities are not prohibited, how can it be a
punishable offense to help these potential blackmailers keep their guilty
secrets? If X is a legal, nonprohibited act, and A helps B carry it out,
Epstein's attempt to justify the criminalization of blackmail is equivalent
to urging the incarceration of A but not B!
In the first sections of his article, Epstein was quite clear that threats
of force or fraud were the necessary and sufficient conditions for categorizing an activity as criminal. But in his sociological Section III,
although he still maintains this distinction,' he appears to have lost sight
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 564-65.
38. States Epstein: "Blackmail is made a crime not only because of what it is, but because
of what it necessarily leads to." Id. at 566 (emphasis added). But this is surely incorrect. Is it
really necessary that the "victim" of blackmail give in to his baser instincts and engage in real
crime? Cannot even one blackmailee resist the temptation? Surely there is no logical contradiction in supposing that a blackmailee could overcome the temptation to commit the crime.
39. Id. at 564.
40. The blackmailee "is subject only to blackmail, not the threats of force or fraud." Id. at
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of its vital importance.
Perhaps this arises out of a confusion between morality (the study of
what is or is not immoral) and legal philosophy (the study of what should
or should not be prohibited by force of law). Epstein holds that "[a]s a
moral matter... blackmail is criminal because of its necessary tendency
to induce deception and other wrongs."'" He claims that blackmail
"breeds fraud and deceit,"'42 and characterizes it as "sneaky and dirty."4
Blackmail may well be underhanded, evil, vicious, reprehensible and immoral. But this is entirely beside the point. Our concern here is solely
with the question of the criminal, not moral, status of blackmail.' Unless Epstein advocates that all immoral people be incarcerated, he must
relinquish his opposition to the legalization of blackmail. He may have
successfully explained why blackmail is abhorrent in popular sentiment,
but he has not justified its legal prohibition.
IV.

NOZICK: BLACKMAIL AS AN UNPRODUCTIVE EXCHANGE

A third objection, developed by Robert Nozick,4 5 arises in the realm
of philosophy. Nozick begins his critique of the position staked out in
this article by distinguishing between productive and nonproductive activities. If a set of exchanges
were impossible or forceably prohibited so that everyone knew
they couldn't be done, one of the parties to the potential exchange would be no worse off. A strange kind of productive
exchange it would be whose forbidding leaves one party no
worse off! (The party who does not give up anything for the
abstention, or need not because the neighbor has no other motive to proceed with the action, is left better off). Though people value a blackmailer's silence, and pay for it, his being silent
is not a productive activity. His victims would be as well off if
the blackmailer did not exist at all, and so wasn't threatening
them. And they would be no worse off if the exchange were
known to be absolutely impossible.46
On the basis of this distinction, Nozick would allow, as a productive
41. Id. (emphasis added).

42. Id.
43. Id. at 566. Epstein also argues against blackmail on the grounds that it leads to the

concealment of information. His argument is effectively criticized in Lindgren, Unraveling the
Paradoxof Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 670, 684-87 (1984).
44. See supra note 8.
45. R. NoziCK, ANARCHY, STATE, & UTOPIA (1974).

46. Id. at 85 (footnote omitted).
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exchange, a person to purchase your neighbor's abstention from building
a "monstrosity" on his land, which "he has a right to do."'4 7 However,
suppose
that the neighbor has no desire to erect the structure on the
land; he formulates his plan and informs you of it solely in order to sell you his abstention from it. Such an exchange would
not be a productive one; it merely gives you relief from some-

thing that would not threaten if not for the possibility of an
exchange to get relief from it.4 8

In other words, it is acceptable for the neighbor who honestly wants
to build the "monstrosity" to be brought out of this notion, since it is a
productive exchange; but, for the bluffer to attempt such a trade, it
would be an unproductive imposition. Applying this example to our subject, many cases of blackmail seem allowable.
Imagine that the neighbor builds the monstrosity just because he
dislikes you and knows that building it will anger you. Suppose instead
that he constructs the monstrosity for the same reason but knows that

one response of yours will be to offer him money to desist. Neither of
these cases seems to be one of impermissible conduct, and the latter is

not, by Nozick's criterion, an unproductive exchange.49 If so, isn't a case

of blackmail where the collection of information is motivated by dislike

of the victim a productive exchange? Only if the blackmailer would not
collect the information unless he could threaten the victim with exposure
would we have a case of unproductive exchange.5 0
There are problems, however, with this view. Based on the given
criteria,5 1 which distinguish the productive (both parties benefit and both
47. Id. at 84-85. Lord Wright in Thorne v. Motor Trade Ass'n, 1937 A.C. 797, would
agree:
[A man] may offer not to build on his plot of land if he is compensated for abstaining.
He is entitled to bargain as a consideration for agreeing not to use his own land as he
lawfully may, and the other man may think it worthwhile to pay him, rather than
have the amenities of his house destroyed by an eyesore.
Id. at 820. But according to A. H. Campbell, although "a man may doubtless ask a price from
his neighbour for refraining from building and spoiling the neighbour's view," the land must
be "building land," and does "not necessarily cover a threat to erect a 'spite fence.'" Campbell, The Anomalies of Blackmail, 15 LAW Q. REv. 382, 388 & n.13 (1939).
48. R. NOZiCK, supra note 10, at 84-85.
49. Id. at 84.
50. David Gordon wishes to thank Robert Nozick for very helpful suggestions, and wishes
to deny responsibility for the material which appears in Section IV after this point.
51. Nozick appears to equivocate between utilizing this criterion and another one called
felicitously by Rothbard the "drop dead" principle. M. ROTHBARD, supra note 26, at 240-43,
wherein an exchange is nonproductive if the "victim" would be better off if the blackmailer
didn't exist at all. At one point, Nozick claims that this second criterion is a necessary condi-
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lose if prohibited) from the unproductive (if it were prohibited one
party-"the victim"-would be no worse off), the shenanigans of both
the "honest" builder and the bluffer would be unproductive. Both harm
the "victim." Both, therefore, should be banned by law. For in each case
the victim would be no worse off if the activity was thought to be impossible. The honest Dr. Frankenstein should be allowed to proceed, and to
be bought off; this is conceded. But so should the bluffing Dr. Frankenstein, for Nozick has failed to maintain a relevant difference between
them. It is difficult to see, moreover, why "unproductive" exchanges, in
this sense, ought to be prohibited or singled out for special regulations.
Nozick also fails to distinguish between the idea of the activity
thought to be impossible and the idea of the activity which is forceably
prohibited. In his explanation he uses the two activities interchangeably.
Yes, the "victim" would be better off if the blackmailer did not exist, or
did not realize it was possible for him to act in such a way. But if the
blackmailer did exist, and did realize this, the "victim" would be made
worse off by forceably prohibiting his activity. In such a scenario the
blackmailer would be able to exercise his option of free speech and gossip
about the "victim's" secret. Says Rothbard, "outlawing a blackmail contract means that the blackmailer has no further incentive not to disseminate the2 unwelcome, hitherto secret information about the blackmailed
5
party.")
Nozick then launches into a defense of the medieval just-price theory in an attempt to determine precisely how much consideration a
blackmailer deserves for his services. "[A] seller of such silence could
legitimately charge only for what he forgoes by silence."5 3 On the face of
it, this seems a quixotic argument. Nozick further complicates matters
by asserting that a "person ...who delights in revealing secrets[ ] may
charge differently."5 4 Presumably, this amount would be greater than
that charged by the blackmailer only interested in pecuniary gains. But
this unearths more difficulties than it solves. Asks Rothbard:
Why is it only licit to charge the payment foregone? Why not
charge whatever the blackmailee is willing to pay? In the first
place, both transactions are voluntary, and within the purview
of both parties' property rights. Secondly, no one knows, either
conceptually or in practice, what price the blackmailer could
tion for unproductive activity, R. NozIcK, supra note 10, at 84, but later seems to regard it as
sufficient. Id. at 85-86.
52. M. ROTHBARD, supra note 26, at 242.

53. R. NozicK, supra note 10, at 85.
54. Id. at 86 n.*.
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have gotten for his secret on the market. No one can predict a
market price in advance of the actual exchange.... [W]hat
outside legal enforcement agency will ever be able to discover to
what extent the blackmailer delights in revealing secrets and
therefore what price he may legally charge to the "victim"?
More broadly, it is conceptually impossible ever to discover the
existence or the extent of this subjective delight or of any other
psychic factors that may enter into his value-scale and therefore
into his exchange."
Nozick's last contribution to the dialogue consists of this assertion:
"Protective services are productive and benefit their recipient whereas
the 'protection racket' is not productive. Being sold the racketeers' mere
abstention from harming you makes your situation no better than if they
' 56
had nothing to do with you at all.
This is true enough. But it is not even relevant to our discussion of
blackmail, which we have defined as demanding money under the threat
of doing something legal. Rather, it is an attack on extortion, as we have
defined it, which is the demand for money upon a threat of what one does
not have the right to do. In a protection racket, the threat is to murder,
rape or pillage unless tribute is granted. Nothing said above should be
construed as a defense of such an activity. Indeed, we have been at some
pain to distinguish extortion, whether or not of the protection racket variety, from legitimate blackmail.57
55. M. ROTHBARD, supra note 26, at 242-43 (emphasis in original).

56. R. NozICK, supra note 10, at 86.
57. Another person who fails to distinguish between extortion and blackmail is the best-

selling author Dick Francis. In his book The Danger, the hero, a person whose firm specialized in helping kidnap victims, speaks as follows:

We sometimes did, as a firm, work for no pay; it depended on circumstances. All the
partners agreed that a family in need should get help regardless, and none of us

begrudged it. We never charged enough anyway to make ourselves rich, being in
existence on the whole to defeat extortion, not to practiseit. A flat fee, plus expenses:
no percentages. Our clients knew for sure that the size of the ransom in no way

affected our own reward.
D. FRANcIS, THE DANGER 147 (1983) (emphasis added).

Francis, in other words, like Nozick, fails to see the crucial difference between, in this
case, what the kidnapper does (extortion) and what the hero's firm does (stop extortionate
kidnappers). The point is that it does not really matter what the firm charges for its services.
It could charge an arm and a leg; it could charge the sun, the moon and the stars; it could even
charge more than the ransom demanded by the kidnappers themselves The firm would still

not be guilty of extortion, since it would be threatening only that which it has every right to
threaten-to withhold its services unless its very high prices were met.
Unless this crucial distinction is maintained, we are in danger of incarcerating innocents
who refuse to be good Samaritans (by providing kidnap-rescue services for "high" prices)
along with the really guilty parties, the kidnappers.
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LINDGREN: BLACKMAIL AND THE IMPROPER

USE OF INFORMATION

Another attempt to justify the illegality of blackmail is offered by
James Lindgren." s His theory stresses the "triangular nature of the
transaction," or "third-party leverage." 9 In this view, there are really
three main actors in the blackmail drama, not two: A is the blackmail
victim; B is the blackmailer; and C is the "forgotten man." C is the
individual ignored in the typical analysis of blackmail, the person who,
but for the willingness of B to keep a secret, would react negatively to the
interests of A. In the case of the threat to expose a bed wetter, for example, C represents those people who would shun A; in the case of the
threat to expose a crime, C represents the state who would prosecute and
incarcerate.
Why, then, in Lindgren's analysis, is blackmail a crime? Because in
all cases, B is trading in on information to which he has no legitimate
title. Says Lindgren:
At the heart of blackmail, then, is the triangular nature of
the transaction, and particularly this disjunction between the
blackmailer's personal benefit and the interests of the third parties whose leverage he uses. In effect, the blackmailer attempts
to gain an advantage in return for suppressing someone else's
actual or potential interest. The blackmailer is negotiating for
his own gain with someone else's leverage or bargaining chips.
...Under my theory, blackmail is the seeking of an advantage by threatening to press an actual or potential dispute that
is primarily between the blackmail victim and someone else.
The blackmailer threatens to bring others into the dispute but
typically asks for something for himself; he turns someone
else's power, usually group power, to personal benefit. The bargaining is unfair in that the threatener uses leverage that is less
6°
his than someone else's.
Perhaps an example would be useful here. Suppose you discover
that a married woman is having an affair. You threaten to tell her husband unless she agrees to commence an affair with you. In Lindgren's
view you have intervened in a matter-the status of the couple's marriage-that does not directly concern you. You are attempting to benefit

58. Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 670 (1984).
59. Id. at 702.
60. Id. at 702-03.
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from information that properly belongs to the couple, or perhaps to the
husband.
Lindgren's theory of blackmail cannot be sustained. Why should it
be illegal to use information about matters that involve someone else's
interests more than one's own? Offhand, this seems a perfectly normal,
permissible activity. Suppose, for example, that someone accidentally
overhears information about a business deal to which he is not a party.
As a result of this information he is able to make a "killing" in the market. Should this be illegal? Or suppose someone, such as a detective,
learns of an extramarital affair and sells this information to the spouse of
the person involved in the affair. This transaction is clearly legal, yet the
seller benefits from information that concerns others more than himself.
Lindgren's theory would prohibit this transaction.
Professor Lindgren has anticipated cases of this kind and thinks that
he can escape unscathed. He remarks:
[S]ome sales of private information are legitimate. For instance, a police informer may learn damaging information
about a criminal and release it to the police in return for
money... Under my theory.., the informer has merely
promoted the resolution of the dispute between the government
and the criminal on its merits by releasing information to one of
the principles. He did not suppress, appropriate or settle the
government's interest. The result: no blackmail.6"
Lindgren is quite right in saying that there is no blackmail in this
case. But this misses the point. Shouldn't this conduct, even though it is
not blackmail, also be prohibited? Under Lindgren's principle the person
is using information that involves the interests of others more than it
involves his interests for his own benefit. It will not do to say that the
information-seller has merely added to the available data rather than engaged in suppression, as does the blackmailer. Why is one form of interference better or worse than the other? On what grounds is it being
claimed, if indeed it is, that the more information available to the parties
the more legal the situation? It is not, at any rate, immediately evident
why it is alright to assist a party to a dispute who would benefit by increased knowledge, while one may not help a person who wishes to conceal information.
Lindgren may reply that this criticism ignores the aim of his argument. "[A] core principle of our legal system," he notes, is "the assignment of enforcement rights to the victim: an individual enforces a
61. Id. at 706.
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private wrong and the state enforces a public wrong."'62 Blackmail, Lindgren thinks, "suppresses" this fundamental right. In point of fact it
does not do so. The victim is as free as before to pursue all his legal
remedies. In our example, the husband is not deprived of any of his legal
rights by not being told of his wife's adultery. The fact that he might
take a certain course of action if he knew about the adultery, which he
would not do otherwise, generates no duty in others to assist him to acquire that information. There is, in general, no "right to information";
otherwise, someone who acquired knowledge of an affair, for example,
would be under a duty to disclose it. If there were such a "right to information," it would be illegal for attorneys, doctors, economists, and
others whose main stock in trade is the sense of providing information.
The fundamental flaw in Lindgren's method of analysis, we suggest,
is his loose talk about "leverage" and using "chips" that belong to someone else. While the reader gets some idea of what Lindgren means, his
vivid expressions dissolve into unclarity on closer analysis. Exactly what
constitutes someone's "chips"? If Lindgren had explicitly stated precisely which rights the blackmailer is allegedly violating, instead of placing crucial reliance on metaphor, he would have seen that his theory
depends upon an insupportable claim that one has a duty to provide information to certain persons, whom he terms "victims." The sense in
which he uses the word "victim" is also left largely a matter of mystery.63
VI.

CONCLUSION

We must conclude, and hope that we have demonstrated, that the
efforts of Professors Richard Posner, Richard Epstein, Robert Nozick
and James Lindgren have not been successful in demonstrating that
blackmail, as opposed to extortion, should remain illegal. Their efforts,
of course, have been nothing short of brilliant. Given that one is assigned
the task of defending the prohibition of blackmail, it would be hard to see
how they could have been more resourceful, creative or insightful.
The authors of the present Article, in contrast, did not start out with
any particular position on this issue. This is because, perhaps, we
strongly resisted the notion that denigrated, despised and immoral actions necessarily need to be prohibited by law. As a result, in our view,
we were able to maintain the distinction between extortion (threatening
an act which is in and of itself illegal), which should remain prohibited,
62. Id. at 704 (footnote omitted).
63. We do not mean to suggest by these remarks that Lindgren's article is of no value. On
the contrary, its criticisms of other theories of blackmail are highly penetrating.

54
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and blackmail (threatening an act which apart from the demand for valuable consideration is legal), which should be legalized.

